# Difference between revisions of "Absolute certainty"

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Possessing '''absolute certainty''' in a fact, or [[Bayesian probability]] of 1, isn't a good idea. Losing an epistemic bet made with absolute certainty corresponds to receiving infinite negative payoff, according to the logarithmic [[scoring rule|proper scoring rule]]. | Possessing '''absolute certainty''' in a fact, or [[Bayesian probability]] of 1, isn't a good idea. Losing an epistemic bet made with absolute certainty corresponds to receiving infinite negative payoff, according to the logarithmic [[scoring rule|proper scoring rule]]. | ||

## Revision as of 07:33, 21 October 2010

Possessing **absolute certainty** in a fact, or Bayesian probability of 1, isn't a good idea. Losing an epistemic bet made with absolute certainty corresponds to receiving infinite negative payoff, according to the logarithmic proper scoring rule.

The same principle applies to mathematical truths. Not possessing absolute certainty in math doesn't make the math itself uncertain, the same way that an uncertain map doesn't cause the territory to blur out. The world, and the math, are precise, while knowledge about them is incomplete.

The impossibility of justified absolute certainty is sometimes used as a rationalization for the fallacy of gray.