# Difference between revisions of "Absolute certainty"

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The impossibility of justified absolute certainty is sometimes used as a [[rationalization]] for the [[fallacy of gray]]. | The impossibility of justified absolute certainty is sometimes used as a [[rationalization]] for the [[fallacy of gray]]. | ||

− | ==See | + | ==See also== |

*[[Bayesian probability]] | *[[Bayesian probability]] | ||

*[[Scoring rule]] | *[[Scoring rule]] |

## Revision as of 03:56, 30 May 2009

Possessing **absolute certainty** in a fact, or Bayesian probability of 1, isn't a good idea. Losing an epistemic bet made with absolute certainty corresponds to receiving infinite negative payoff, according to the logarithmic proper scoring rule.

The same principle applies to mathematical truths. Not possessing absolute certainty in math doesn't make the math itself uncertain, the same way that an uncertain map doesn't cause the territory to blur out. The world, and the math, are precise, while knowledge about them is incomplete.

The impossibility of justified absolute certainty is sometimes used as a rationalization for the fallacy of gray.

## See also

## Blog posts

- Infinite Certainty by Eliezer Yudkowsky
- 0 And 1 Are Not Probabilities by Eliezer Yudkowsky
- How to Convince Me That 2 + 2 = 3 by Eliezer Yudkowsky