Difference between revisions of "Aumann's agreement theorem"

From Lesswrongwiki
Jump to: navigation, search
m
(Blog posts: Coin Guessing Game)
Line 13: Line 13:
 
*[http://www.overcomingbias.com/2006/12/agreeing_to_agr.html Agreeing to Agree] by [[Hal Finney]]
 
*[http://www.overcomingbias.com/2006/12/agreeing_to_agr.html Agreeing to Agree] by [[Hal Finney]]
 
*[http://lesswrong.com/lw/gq/the_proper_use_of_humility/ The Proper Use of Humility] by [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]
 
*[http://lesswrong.com/lw/gq/the_proper_use_of_humility/ The Proper Use of Humility] by [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]
 +
*[http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/01/the_coin_guessi.html The Coin Guessing Game] by [[Hal Finney]], a toy problem illustrating the mechanics of Aumann agreement
  
 
==References==
 
==References==

Revision as of 12:36, 7 September 2009

Smallwikipedialogo.png
Wikipedia has an article about

Aumann's agreement theorem, informally stated, says that two people acting rationally (in a certain precise sense) and with common knowledge of each other's beliefs cannot agree to disagree. More specifically, if two people are genuine Bayesians, share common priors, and have common knowledge of each other's current probability assignments, then they must have equal probability assignments.

Outside of well-functioning prediction markets, Aumann's conditions can probably only be reached by careful deliberative discourse: whether deliberation tends to resolve disagreements in practice is an empirical question.

See also

Blog posts

References

  • Robert J. Aumann (1976). "Agreeing to Disagree". The Annals of Statistics 4 (6): 1236-1239. ISSN 00905364.  (PDF)
  • Tyler Cowen and Robin Hanson (2004). Are Disagreements Honest?.  (PDF, Talk video)