# Difference between revisions of "Expected utility"

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{{wikilink|Expected utility hypothesis}} | {{wikilink|Expected utility hypothesis}} | ||

− | '''Expected utility''' is the [[expected value]] of | + | {{arbitallink|https://arbital.com/p/expected_utility/|Expected utility}} |

+ | '''Expected utility''' is the [[expected value]] in terms of the [[utility]] produced by an action. It is the sum of the utility of each of its possible consequences, individually weighted by their respective probability of occurrence. | ||

− | Von Neumann and Morgenstern proved the [http://web.archive.org/web/20070221104329/http://www.econ.hku.hk/~wsuen/uncertainty/eu.pdf expected utility theorem], which | + | A rational decision maker will, when presented with a choice, take the action with the greatest expected utility. Von Neumann and Morgenstern provided [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Morgenstern_utility_theorem#The_axioms| 4 basic axioms of rationality]. They also proved the [http://web.archive.org/web/20070221104329/http://www.econ.hku.hk/~wsuen/uncertainty/eu.pdf expected utility theorem], which states a rational agent ought to have preferences that maximize his total utility. Humans often deviate from rationality due to inconsistent preferences or the existence of [http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Bias cognitive biases]. |

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==Blog posts== | ==Blog posts== | ||

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*[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1cv/extreme_risks_when_not_to_use_expected_utility/ Extreme risks: when not to use expected utility] | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1cv/extreme_risks_when_not_to_use_expected_utility/ Extreme risks: when not to use expected utility] | ||

*[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1d5/expected_utility_without_the_independence_axiom/ Expected utility without the independence axiom] | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1d5/expected_utility_without_the_independence_axiom/ Expected utility without the independence axiom] | ||

*[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1dr/money_pumping_the_axiomatic_approach/ Money pumping: the axiomatic approach] | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1dr/money_pumping_the_axiomatic_approach/ Money pumping: the axiomatic approach] | ||

*[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ga/in_conclusion_in_the_land_beyond_money_pumps_lie/ In conclusion: in the land beyond money pumps lie extreme events] | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ga/in_conclusion_in_the_land_beyond_money_pumps_lie/ In conclusion: in the land beyond money pumps lie extreme events] | ||

− | + | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/244/vnm_expected_utility_theory_uses_abuses_and/ VNM expected utility theory: uses, abuses, and interpretation] | |

==See also== | ==See also== | ||

## Latest revision as of 06:40, 28 August 2016

**Expected utility** is the expected value in terms of the utility produced by an action. It is the sum of the utility of each of its possible consequences, individually weighted by their respective probability of occurrence.

A rational decision maker will, when presented with a choice, take the action with the greatest expected utility. Von Neumann and Morgenstern provided 4 basic axioms of rationality. They also proved the expected utility theorem, which states a rational agent ought to have preferences that maximize his total utility. Humans often deviate from rationality due to inconsistent preferences or the existence of cognitive biases.

## Blog posts

- Extreme risks: when not to use expected utility
- Expected utility without the independence axiom
- Money pumping: the axiomatic approach
- In conclusion: in the land beyond money pumps lie extreme events
- VNM expected utility theory: uses, abuses, and interpretation