# Difference between revisions of "Expected utility"

From Lesswrongwiki

m (Stuart Armstrong's series) |
PeerInfinity (talk | contribs) |
||

Line 9: | Line 9: | ||

=====By Stuart Armstrong:===== | =====By Stuart Armstrong:===== | ||

− | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1cv/extreme_risks_when_not_to_use_expected_utility/ Extreme | + | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1cv/extreme_risks_when_not_to_use_expected_utility/ Extreme risks: when not to use expected utility] |

− | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1d5/expected_utility_without_the_independence_axiom/ Expected utility without the | + | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1d5/expected_utility_without_the_independence_axiom/ Expected utility without the independence axiom] |

− | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1dr/money_pumping_the_axiomatic_approach/ Money pumping: the | + | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1dr/money_pumping_the_axiomatic_approach/ Money pumping: the axiomatic approach] |

*[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ga/in_conclusion_in_the_land_beyond_money_pumps_lie/ In conclusion: in the land beyond money pumps lie extreme events] | *[http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ga/in_conclusion_in_the_land_beyond_money_pumps_lie/ In conclusion: in the land beyond money pumps lie extreme events] | ||

## Revision as of 08:42, 5 January 2010

**Expected utility** is the expected value of a utility function.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern proved the expected utility theorem, which says that when a rational agent chooses between different "gambles" (probability distributions over outcomes), the utility of such a gamble can always be seen as the expected utility of the gamble's outcome.

Humans, of course, are a different story.

## Blog posts

##### By Stuart Armstrong:

- Extreme risks: when not to use expected utility
- Expected utility without the independence axiom
- Money pumping: the axiomatic approach
- In conclusion: in the land beyond money pumps lie extreme events