Difference between revisions of "Fallacy of gray"
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(Generalizing beyond probabilities.) |
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| − | The '''fallacy of gray''' | + | The '''fallacy of gray''' assumes that, because the extremes on a given measure are impossible, all cases are equivalent. For example: because no statement may be proven with [[absolute certainty]], all statements are equally uncertain. A subscriber to the fallacy may reply to being told that the odds of winning a [[lottery]] is only one in a million by saying: "There's still a chance, right?" |
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
Revision as of 04:44, 10 July 2009
The fallacy of gray assumes that, because the extremes on a given measure are impossible, all cases are equivalent. For example: because no statement may be proven with absolute certainty, all statements are equally uncertain. A subscriber to the fallacy may reply to being told that the odds of winning a lottery is only one in a million by saying: "There's still a chance, right?"
